Introduction
In game theory, the existence of equilibrium was uniformly obtained by the application of a fixed point theorem. In fact, Nash [3, 4] shows the existence of equilibria for noncooperative static games as a direct consequence of Brouwer [1] or Kakutani [2] theorems. More precisely, under some regularity conditions, given a game, there always exists a correspondence whose fixed points coincide with the equilibrium points of the game.
However, it is natural to ask whether fixed points arguments are in fact necessary tools to guarantee the Nash equilibrium existence. (In this direction, Zhao [5] shows the equivalence between Nash equilibrium existence theorem and Kakutani (or Brouwer) fixed point theorem in an indirect way. However, as he points out, a constructive proof is preferable. In fact, any pair of logical sentences A and B that are true will be equivalent (in an indirect way). For instance, to show that A implies B it is sufficient to repeat the proof of B.) For this reason, we study conditions to assure that fixed points of a continuous function, or of a closed-graph correspondence, can be attained as Nash equilibria of a noncooperative game.
Definitions
Let Y ⊂ R n be a convex set. A function v : Y → R is quasiconcave if, for each λ ∈ (0,1), we have v(λy 1 + (1 − λ)y 2 ) ≥ min{v(y 1 ),v(y 2 )}, for all (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ Y × Y . Moreover, if for each pair (y 1 , y 2 ) ∈ Y × Y such that y 1 = y 2 the inequality above is strict, independently of the value of λ ∈ (0,1), we say that v is strictly quasiconcave.
Given a game Ᏻ = {I, S i ,v i }, in which each player i ∈ I = {1, 2,...,n} is characterized by a set of strategies S i ⊂ R ni , and by an objective function v i :
Finally, let Ᏼ = {S : ∃n ∈ N, S ⊂ R n is nonempty, convex, and compact}.
Main Results
Consider the following statements.
[Nash -1] . Given Ᏻ = {I, S i ,v i }, suppose that each set S i ∈ Ᏼ and that objective functions are continuous in its domains and strictly quasiconcave in its own strategy. Then there is a Nash equilibrium for Ᏻ.
[ . Given Ᏻ = {I, S i ,v i }, suppose that each set S i ∈ Ᏼ and that objective functions are continuous in its domains and quasiconcave in its own strategy. Then there is a Nash equilibrium for Ᏻ.
[Brouwer]. Given X ∈ Ᏼ, every continuous function f : X → X has a fixed point.
[Kakutani * ]. Given X ∈ Ᏼ, every closed-graph correspondence Φ : X X, with Φ(x) ∈ Ᏼ for all x ∈ X, has a fixed point, provided that Φ(x) = x) ), is not necessary to assure the existence of a fixed point, provided that the other assumptions hold. However, when objective functions are quasiconcave, [Kakutani * ] is sufficient to assure the existence of a Nash equilibrium.)
Our results are [Nash-1] → [Brouwer] .
Proof. Given a nonempty, convex, and compact set X ⊂ R m and a continuous function f : X → X, consider a game Ᏻ with two players I = {A, B}, which are characterized by the sets of strategies S A = S B = X and by the objective functions:
, where · denotes the Euclidean norm in R m . As objective functions are continuous in S A × S B and strictly quasiconcave in own strategy, there exists a Nash equilibrium (x A ,x B ). Moreover, x A = x B and x B = f (x A ), that assure the existence of a fixed point of f :
Proof. Fix a set X ⊂ Ᏼ and a correspondence Φ : X X that satisfies the assumptions of 
